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This paper offers a close reading of one architectural text engaged in “knowledge transfer”: the 
use of evolutionary biology discourse as an explanatory account and authority claim supporting 
Greg Lynn’s Embryological House Project (2000). This essay addresses the twin conference 
themes of knowledge transfer and the potential threat posed to the specificity of architectural 
techniques. By offering a detailed reading, this paper argues that information transfer is not an 
innocuous activity, but involves the critical transformation of source material. This paper argues 
that technology transfer should acknowledge the workings of an ever-present technology, the 
“technology of architecture”. This term designates the set of techniques governing the reworking 
of material from domains exterior to architecture, into material pliable for architecture. In this 
paper architecture’s evolutionary theory borrowings, provides an exemplary instance of 
information transfer marked by displacement, not straightforward transmission.  
 
1 Paper 
Once again architecture, in search of its lost object, is contaminated by this model fever. 
Christopher Alexander is already a precursor, and models can now be seen everywhere. 
They become the architectural avant-garde, bringing a kind of scientific guarantee given 
the tool of mathematics (which through science in its own domain become techniques 
when applied elsewhere – a phenomenon little understood by those who believe in a sort 
of osmosis whereby architecture, through the application of mathematical models, can 
itself become a science.) 
Diana I. Agrest, “The Misfortunes of Theory”  (1974) 
 
Knowledge has become an economic phenomenon. As one economist, Dominique Foray 
argues, since the 1970s, new economic formations have emerged: knowledge-based 
economies, defined by the proportion of “knowledge-intensive jobs”. (Foray, ix). Foray observes 
that, “science and technology tend to be central to the new sectors tending to give momentum 
to the upward growth of the economy”, and that these realignments “are reflected in an ever-
increasing proliferation of jobs in the production, processing, and transfer of knowledge and 
information.” (Foray, ix-x) Over the last fifteen years, architecture’s engagement with the 
disciplines of science and technology parallels this broader historical transformation of post-
industrial societies. The economic calibration of knowledge, its “economic characteristics”, and 
status as a “good” and the financial valuation of knowledge transfer and reproduction, are not 
addressed by this paper. However, I wanted to mark the origins of the term “knowledge transfer” 
in the discipline of economics, because this paper is concerned with one architectural case of 
“knowledge transfer” and the complexities attending this move, where the economic term 
“transfer’ becomes somewhat inadequate to the task of describing the reformation of scientific 
claims within the discipline of architecture. This paper investigates one architectural 
transformation of evolutionary theory and argues that the reformulation and rewriting of material 
extraneous to architecture involves another technology, the “technology of architecture”.  
Greg Lynn’s Embryological House Project (2000), is one of a number of widely circulated 
contemporary projects that mark architecture’s intersection with the specialised discourses of 
biology (AD 26-35). The text accompanying the publication of this project forms a central 
document for this paper. The presence of two specialist disciplines, biology and architecture, 
and the intriguing question of their intersection is staged in an impressive seamless movement 
in the opening paragraphs. After a series of digital renderings of his design, with intriguing 
captions such as embyo and egg, captions seeming to signpost the place of biology in this 
project, Lynn’s text opens with architectural claims about new, contemporary modes of 
production and aesthetics: 
The Embryologic Houses can be described as a strategy for the invention of domestic 
space that engages contemporary issues of brand identity and variation, customisation 
and continuity, flexible manufacturing and assembly and, most importantly, an 
unapologetic investment in the contemporary beauty and voluptuous aesthetics of 
undulating surfaces rendered vividly in iridescent and opalescent colours. (Lynn, AD, 31) 
This detour from biology via traditional architectural concerns marks the interface of two 
discourses, and the project of reworking one via the other. The point of intersection begins to be 
clarified in the next sentence “The Embryologic Houses employ a rigorous system of 
geometrical limits that liberate models of endless variations.” (Lynn, AD, 31) Addressing brand 
identity and variation allows “recognition and novelty” and “design innovation and 
experimentation.” (Lynn, AD, 31) All of the implications of this form of production, which Mario 
Carpo terms “non-standard seriality”, “mass producing a series in which all items are different” 
will not really concern us here, but of interest is the deployment of economic terms from late 
capitalist modes of production to form the links between discourses.  (Carpo 99) The final part of 
Lynn’s first paragraph provides the next linkage in the chain. The chain has so far moved from 
economies of production/consumption, to an aesthetic claim, to design techniques, back to 
avant-garde aesthetic terms (innovation and experimentation) and finally a larger picture 
emerges in this last sentence: 
In addition to both design innovation and experimentation, many of the variations in the 
Embryologic houses come from an adaptation to contingencies of lifestyle, site, climate, 
construction methods, materials, spatial effects, functional needs and special aesthetic 
affects. (Lynn, AD, 31) 
The word “adaptation” is possibly drawn from biological discourse and this connection seems 
more substantiated by the next paragraph which begins, “There is no ideal or original 
Embryologic house. Everyone is perfect in its mutations.” Moreover the “formal perfection 
derives from “a combination of the unique, intricate variations of each instance and the 
continuous similarity of its relatives.” And then after indicating that the variation occurs in the 
relationship between the generic envelope and a fixed collection of elements, Lynn delivers his 
final sentence of the second paragraph and makes a larger historical claim, “This marks a shift 
from a modernist, mechanical technique to a more vital, evolving, biological model of 
embryological design and construction.” (Lynn, AD, 31) Here borrowings from the discourse of 
biology are marshalled to produce a new internal history of architecture. This is one of the 
strategic effects of citing biological discourse. It shapes a certain mode of contemporary 
architecture as a more naturalistic mode of production. The place of a new economic formation 
,“mass customisation”, is eclipsed by the realignment of the new “biological” mode within a 
longer architectural history premised on a binary formulation: of older mechanistic versus new 
biological paradigms. 
The appearance of words normally exterior to the discipline of architecture - adaptation, 
mutation, relatives (and of course embryology) - all of which are biological terms raises the 
intriguing issue of the strategic effect of these citations in an architectural discourse. The first 
three terms in particular are closely associated with evolutionary theory. The next part of my 
essay involves a close analysis of the disciplinary outlines of evolutionary theory in order to 
investigate the status and meaning of the scientific discipline’s particular terms when they are 
displaced into architecture. 
Evolutionary theory seeks to account for a particular kind of biological change: variation, the 
ways in which variations in organisms give rise to new species, the ways in which those 
variations are transmitted over generations, the mechanisms of heredity, how these variations 
are “selected”, that is survive, the belief that some of these variations may be beneficial, and 
that there is a correlation between variation, adaptability and survival, demonstrating that 
adaptation ensures greater survival. (Jablonka and Lamb) The field is vast, specialised and 
complex, and most importantly, full of disagreement, hesitations, qualifications and uncertainty. 
These contests mark the place of evolutionary theory as a social discipline, comprised of 
competing or different accounts. Some of these disagreements can be recounted by exploring 
the complexity of terms such as mutability and variation, two of Lynn’s key terms. 
Evolution is in one sense a biological version of history. It seeks to account for change. 
Transformation, difference and the persistence of certain transformations, their triumph, is 
viewed, and noted. Evolution relies on a model of temporality, like history, to understand and 
judge its material. It operates with a notion of inheritance, the traits transmitted from generation 
to generation. These qualities and their persistence can only be known retrospectively. Only by 
looking back can scientists decide which traits and behaviours have been transmitted and 
selected over time. There are many debates as to whether this is a slow process that is gradual 
(very, very gradual) or whether there can be rapid genomic restructuring. (Jablonka and Lamb 
70-71) (And it is not clear to me what rapid might be in terms of evolutionary time). Moreover 
what constitutes the targets of selection – genes or individuals, groups or species - has been 
debated, most adamantly by Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould. (Jablonka and Lamb 38) 
Moreover, it is possible that the evolutionary process may be entirely random and any historical 
model premised on causality and determinism might fail due to the operations of contingency. In 
other words, individual agents (at the level of individuals, groups or species) may play no part in 
the persistence and reproduction of survivable traits. 
Variation is complex and entails several possible mechanisms. Heritable variation occurs 
through genetic mutation and also sexual reproduction. Mutation, with which Greg Lynn is 
concerned, refers to changes in DNA sequences. However the reasons for these changes are 
variable, caused by internal imperfections in the copying process, or by other internal activities, 
or by external causes. However, mutation is not considered to be a primary factor in variation. 
Mutation rates are deemed to be low, because lineages with good heredity needed faithful 
transmission dependant upon accurate copies of genes.  
The second form of variation, one that Lynn does not address, although it is considered to be 
the primary cause of difference, is sexual reproduction. Sexual reproduction produces 
enormous variation and is the most obvious source of genetic variation. Offspring are never 
equally mixed and equally weighted clones of their parental material. The importance of sexual 
reproduction as the most obvious source of variation was skewed early in the last century when 
a number of theorists, such as Hugo de Vries and William Bateson had argued that evolution 
occurred in big leaps. For de Vries  “the driving force in evolution was mutation, a process that 
suddenly and without cause irreversibly changed the germ plasm ( a part of the chromosomal 
material set aside for eggs, etc, whatever gives rise to the next generation). Mutation “produced 
a new type of organism in a single step.” (Jablonka and Lamb 23) This thesis remains highly 
controversial. Mutations are new genetic variants but in evolutionary terms, their importance is 
always measured within a longer time span. Will the mutation survive into the next generation 
and will it be selected?  
I have spent some time outlining some of the major disagreements in evolutionary theory in 
order to establish the ways in which major terms and theories remain under contest in this 
expert discipline. These quite different investigations of key terms introduce a number of levels 
of complexity in the problem of accounting for cause and effect in evolutionary change. Terms 
that I had assumed were stable, become much more complex due to the range of possible 
explanations. These disagreements are not noted in Lynn’s discourse, and through this 
omission, key terms destabilised in evolutionary theory become much more stable and certain 
when deployed in an architectural setting. Later in the paper I will address the issues generated 
by this transformation; the problem of how we should read such specialised technical terms 
when they are radically disjoined from their former expert domain. 
In part I have given such a long account of the outline of the discipline of evolutionary theory 
because I am interested in marking the radical incommensurability of parts of evolutionary 
discourse with architectural modes of production.  I note this disjunction in order to later address 
the problem of how we should read the architectural use of evolutionary theory when 
architecture cannot fulfil some of the key criteria of evolutionary discourse.  Two dissonant  
architectural areas stand out for attention because of their strident deviation from the originary 
scientific discourse . One is the limited definition of evolutionary variation in architecture and 
how variation operates (Lynn’s focus on mutation not sexual reproduction), and the other 
domain entails the difficulty of imagining how the evolutionary selection mechanism would 
operate in architecture. 
Since computer software simulation programs do not have the biological capability to breed and 
reproduce, it is understandable that Lynn would focus on mutation rather than sexual 
reproduction. Mutation however, creates new variations in genes, within one reproductive cycle. 
It offers a shorter time span. Mutation engages directly with the problem of iteration as a 
copying process, since mutation is a differential process in copying material. However, as I 
noted above, in current evolutionary theory, mutation rates in lineages that survive are deemed 
to be low. So whilst mutation occurs it is disjoined from evolutionary success. 
Another problem occurs when evaluating variation in architecture due to the production cycle of 
design. Evolutionary history, imagined here through the mechanism of selection across 
generations, is the only way of measuring transmission and survival of variations (no matter 
their source). Variations need to be heritable across generations. Even if we take the time 
between human generations to be sixteen years, it is in no way equitable to the temporal 
dimension of computer iterations. Perhaps we’re talking about fruit flies or e.coli bacteria with 
shorter time spans. I’m presuming because of the title of the project “embryological” and its 
morphology that we’re referring at the very least to a mammalian embryo. The non-correlation of 
evolutionary time and design or production time remains problematic in this discourse. 
Even setting the issue of temporality aside, another problem persists: the selection mechanism, 
Evolutionary history is a form of history written for victors. There may be many contingent 
factors that ensure the survivability of certain traits over others. Success in this endeavour can 
only be known and judged after the fact, never in the midst of the event and given that selection 
operates as a mechanism outside and above individuals, it may never be able to harnessed and 
determined by them, and certainly not in their lifetimes, since it must be transmitted and 
evaluated across generations. In other words, any architect or generation would have to leave 
the evaluation of their work to a historical process. Only the long span of time confers success 
and legitimacy on the project’s claims to adaptability and mutation as a form of success. 
Otherwise any architectural project could just be a mutation that has no benefit or success in 
evolutionary terms. It could just be one mutation amongst many. 
I have noted three effects in this operation of “knowledge transfer” of evolutionary theory into 
architectural discourse: the production of a new internal history of architecture, the selected 
deployment of terms associated with a scientific discipline to produce new modes of description 
of architectural production and the production of a certain stability around terms that are 
unstable and contested in their original scientific domain. Moreover, I have suggested that a 
radical incommensurability prevents us from using evolutionary theory to evaluate current 
modes of architecture in evolutionary terms.  
Attempting to read architecture’s use of evolutionary theory as extensions of a scientific, 
technically expert discourse has produced a certain number of difficulties. Architectural design 
and production is not an extension of evolutionary theory but a distinct discipline. Even when 
architecture shares similar techniques with scientific fields – such as data modelling techniques 
used to model flows of weather data or the mapping of molecular energy landscapes, 
techniques which have been discerned in Greg Lynn’s processes, the displacement from 
original fields of use, generates intriguing differences.  (Lenoir and Alt 347) My concern is these 
differences and the status of these distinctions. 
I will confine my discussion, for the sake of brevity to the function of language in marking these 
differences. I have focussed on the discontinuity of meaning in the appearance of terms 
generated by one discourse when deployed in another. If the terms of evolutionary theory which 
erupt in architecture do not achieve the complexity of expert, technical scientific discourse what 
are the reading conditions that govern our understanding of these words in architecture? I will 
argue that these terms function metaphorically. 
Susan Sontag, in the opening paragraph of her book Aids and its Metaphors, quotes Aristotle’s 
work Poetics to offer a succinct definition of metaphor, “Metaphor consists in giving the thing a 
name that belongs to something else. (Sontag,1988, 5). This definition denotes the ways in 
which metaphors trade in the traffic between resemblance and difference. Aristotle’s use of the 
term occurred in a text on literature, but Sontag’s book reminds us of the migration of metaphor 
from a specialised tool of literature and its studies of figurative language,  into a form of analysis 
of ordinary language and technical languages, occurring within many disciplinary domains in the 
twentieth century. The role of metaphor as a component of non-literary language was 
inaugurated by the work of early twentieth-century linguists such as Roman Jakobson in his 
study of folktales. In the later twentieth century linguists and anthropologists increasingly 
focussed on the role of metaphors in so called ordinary language (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980,) 
Apart from Sontag’s study of metaphors in certain medical conceptualisations of illness such as 
cancer and AIDS, a number of philosophers of science have studied the role of metaphors in 
conceptualising science, in particular biological discourses (Kay, Jacobus, Keller, Shuttleworth, 
Keller, Tuana). These studies examine metaphor in order to understand the ideological function 
of knowledge formation. But they also suggest the ways in which shifts in a discipline’s 
knowledge domain are given shape by new metaphors.  
Aristotle’s attractively brief description of the figurative  function of metaphor should be 
supplemented by the definition it has acquired since the later 1970s. In their study More Than 
Cool Reason George Lakoff and Mark Johnson observe, “a metaphor is not a linguistic 
expression, it is a mapping from one conceptual domain to another (Lakoff and Johnson, 1989, 
203). This account usefully describes the appearance of terms from evolutionary theory in the 
discourse of architecture. A metaphor generated from the importation across disciplinary 
borders, provides a shorthand way of grasping a relationship between apparently dissimilar 
discourses or practices. Deploying metaphors is a compressed, shorthand mode of 
communication, and a way of producing a new proximity between geographically and 
conceptually distant material. 
The work of analogies in the traffic between architecture and other disciplines has been 
investigated by architectural historians and theorists over the last twenty years. A number of 
writers have investigated architecture’s distinctive use of material from fields exterior to itself, 
most particularly, the relationship between philosophy and architecture. (Ingraham, 1988, 1991; 
Speaks; Wigley). The studies by Ingraham and Wigley attempted to examine how architecture 
functions metaphorically for other disciplines. Ingraham argued that architecture operated by 
force of its metaphoric status in culture, apparently designating the proper forms of inhabiting 
space (Ingraham, 1991) and Wigley examined the functioning of architectural terms such as 
foundation within philosophy, a discourse in which architecture was mobilised to ground 
philosophy’s authority claims.  
A more recent architectural study, Adrian Forty’s Words and Buildings,  presents a detailed 
analysis of both language and scientific metaphors within the history of architecture. Forty 
traces the emergence of certain metaphors within architecture and sometimes evaluates the 
historical success of particular metaphors. His definition of metaphor concurs with that offered 
by Lakoff and Johnson, the “characteristic of an effective metaphor is that it borrows an image 
from one schema of ideas and applies it to another, previously unrelated schema.” (Forty, 100) 
Perhaps most importantly for the argument I am making here he notes that “metaphors are 
never more than partial descriptions of the phenomena they seek to describe … indeed were 
they to succeed in total reproduction they would cease to be metaphors which subsist through 
likeness drawn between inherently unlike things.” (Forty 84) Once material has left its original 
disciplinary field (such as evolutionary biology), there is always the possibility that it will start to 
operate as a metaphor, a point of resemblance and as a substitute for the discourse it has left 
behind. In fact this is precisely Ingraham and Wigley’s argument about the metaphorical status, 
and power of architecture in culture and in philosophy. 
Architecture, of course, is not unique in transforming material extraneous to its discipline into 
metaphors.  However architecture provides a spatial formation and realisation of these 
alignments. It gives evolutionary theory a spatial imaginary, and one that is distinct from, 
although proximate to, the uptake of evolutionary theory into economic and managerial 
business models of late capitalism, a project externalised by the founding of the Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics in 1991. The discipline of architecture’s capacity for spatial realisation 
marks the distinctive work of architecture in moments of knowledge transfer, as particular 
disciplinary domains are reformulated in crossing the border into architecture.  
In response to the very interesting initial proposition offered by this conference in its call for 
papers, as to whether knowledge transfer “threatens the consistency and specificity of 
architectural techniques” I would argue that there is always an ever present technology of 
architecture that converts material into spatial realisations, and realigns external material into 
forms of knowledge interior to the discipline of architecture. These operations could be usefully 
described as a “technology” of architecture, reworking Michel Foucault’s famous observations 
on the “technology of sex” as a set of techniques. (Foucault, 90) I borrow this term from 
Foucault to use it strategically as he does, in order to disrupt normative definitions of technology 
as inventions and techniques. Foucault deploys the term technology outside its usual domains 
in order to denaturalise one phenomenon: sex. He mobilises “technology” to designate the 
systematic techniques organising a field of knowledge, even one which appears biological and 
thus natural. He redefines the etymology of technology in order to denaturalise knowledge 
formation and to argue that intellectual domains are determined by structural rules and 
techniques determining what counts as knowledge and what questions can be asked at a given 
historical moment. A discipline is not necessarily marked by the sum off its internal knowledge 
but by its operations, “The ‘economy’ of discourses-their intrinsic technology, the necessities of 
their operation, the tactics they employ, the effects of power which underlie them and which 
they transmit-this, and not a system of representations, is what determines the essential 
features of what they have to say.”  (Foucault 68-69)  For Foucault, technology is a useful term 
to visualise the apparatus that organises knowledge formation and insistently mark the nexus of 
knowledge and power. 
The strange mutations of scientific discourses when rewritten in architecture, of course marks 
architecture’s inside; a terrain where external ideas are not merely imported but formulate new 
internal histories and theories in architecture, where the technology of architecture realigns 
material into its own disciplinary formations. Older architectural terms and questions are both 
continued and discontinued in this formation. Evolutionary theory offers a model for 
investigating notions of generation without a human operator (autogenesis), the rearticulation of 
temporal rupture as a mode of innovation (an avant-garde investment in  the new) and the use 
of evolutionary theory as a model of history to establish legitimation via the historical validation 
of adaptation, selection and survival. Biology offers an ecological model of the environment 
imagined in network and information terms. The ‘organism” or embryo offers a source for form 
generation. This  “Nature” would almost naturalise the workings of ideology, producing a 
transparent and readable nature, different to that posited by one philosopher of science who 
describes the ”mystifying and recalcitrant chaos of higher level organisms”. (Keller, 1995, 81) 
Architectural processes are modes of projection, of transference as well as transfer.  As 
methods they inscribe the force of human editing, selection and rewriting of material. These 
social operations form a discourse, ensuring that its tactics and modes of legitimation are all too 
human, even if its surface may appear otherwise. 
If the terms of evolutionary theory are evacuated of their technical complexity when deployed in 
Lynn’s architectural articulation, this does not make them uninteresting or unuseful.  Analogy 
can mark the place of a complex process of creative appropriation. Analogies may well be the 
starting point for a process of creative generation. They image a new relationship between 
apparently dissonant material. They visualise an idea or operation and make it known in the first 
place so that it can be further investigated and provide the primary point of creative work. The 
difference between technical expert uses of evolutionary theory and their more analogous use 
in architecture might be better understood through the difference between the claims of creative 
usage and authority claims. 
In denoting the difference between creative and authority claims, few contemporary 
architectural commentators are a scrupulous as John Frazer, in his book An Evolutionary 
Architecture. Early in the text, he distinguishes between a scientific hypothesis and a design 
hypothesis and he insists on the nature of inspiration. (Frazer 12)  Even a distinguished and 
careful critic such as Mario Carpo, in a recent essay theorising Lynn and Bernard Cache’s use 
of software simulated designs to form a variable set, a “non-standard series”, slips effortlessly 
into a problematic analogy, remarking on an “algorithmically defined fixed genera and endlessly 
morphing species”. (Carpo 106) And for all of the reasons I’ve argued above, this evolutionary 
analogy, whilst striking, does not bear the weight of close scrutiny, since architectural production 
fails to fulfil the criteria of evolutionary theory. However as a metaphor, an applied borrowing 
from one conceptual schema onto another conceptual schema, it denotes the production of a 
new relationship to produce different knowledge within our discipline; in Carpo’s example, to 
rewrite models of authorship and aesthetic criteria. Moreover metaphors have rhetorical force 
because they function figuratively; they offer a striking image, a visualisation of an idea, and 
their effect can be ascertained by comparing the differences between an abstract formulation 
“mass producing a series in which all items are different” and the fixed genera/ endlessly 
morphing species metaphor deployed by Carpo. I can remember the latter phrase and visualise 
it, but not the former. 
The slide between creative analogies and authority claims lies at the centre of our discipline. 
Deterministic and authoritative accounts of design, rather than acknowledgements of creative 
appropriations prevail in architecture. The remarkable appropriation of contradictory or 
contested and difficult theoretical material into compressed syntheses and useable models is an 
extraordinarily creative process,  but by no means is it logical or inevitable. It evades scientific 
authority claims but makes the claim of creative authority. I do not see this as problematic, 
unless we fail to make the distinction.  
A larger project might further extend the symbolic significance of evolutionary theory in 
contemporary architecture in order to investigate the historical conditions surrounding this kind 
of “knowledge transfer”. Michelle Le Doeuff in a study of imagery in philosophical discourse 
argues that the “meaning conveyed by images works both for and against the system which 
deploys them.” (Le Doeuff 3) Functioning as points of tension and sometimes contradiction, 
images can ‘sustain something which the system itself cannot itself justify, but which is 
nevertheless needed for its proper working.” (Le Doeuff 3) As an architectural historian I would 
speculate that the use of evolutionary biology metaphors not only demarcates an outside to 
architecture but alludes to a larger exterior context, one that supports our work but is invisible in 
our naturalised presentations of evolution: the various alignments of evolutionary theory and 
science and knowledge within the complex political and social formations of post-industrial 
capitalism. This is a subject for another paper. 
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